Preventing tacit collusion is a key objective of regulatory and antitrust authorities. In order to determine what facilitates implicit coordination among competing firms, economic laboratory experiments are utilized to investigate principle characteristics of oligopolistic markets with respect to their propensity to collude tacitly. The main features in focus here are strategic interactions of few competitors and vertically related upstream and downstream markets.
- Horstmann, N., J. Krämer und D. Schnurr (2016). Wholesale Competition, Open Access Regulation and Tacit Collusion. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2757062.
- Horstmann, N., J. Krämer und D. Schnurr (2016). Oligopoly Competition in Continuous Time. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2630664.
- Horstmann, N., J. Krämer und D. Schnurr (2016). Number Effects and Tacit Collusion in Experimental Oligopolies. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2535862.